NATO-Russian relations : opportunities and obstacles by Fischl, Kurt E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2002-06
NATO-Russian relations : opportunities and obstacles
Fischl, Kurt E.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5928




Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: 









 Thesis Advisor:   David S. Yost 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2002 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  NATO-Russian Relations: Opportunities and Obstacles 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Fischl, Kurt E.  
5. FUNDING NUMBERS  
 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
      AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES   The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT  (maximum 200 words) 
      This thesis examines the impact of the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism since 11 
September 2001 on relations between Russia and NATO. This campaign has provided 
opportunities to increase cooperation and enhance Russian interactions with NATO’s political 
structure. The thesis also explores the challenges that must be overcome to form a more 
constructive partnership. Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, international terrorism has 
become a topic of global concern, challenging existing international security structures. Within 
this context, the prospects for further NATO-Russia cooperation in building a new Euro-
Atlantic security structure have dramatically improved. Areas of NATO-Russia cooperation in 
the war on terrorism include increased economic interactions, shared intelligence, improved 
military-to-military exchanges, and enhanced institutional arrangements. The May 2002 
adoption of an “at 20” framework may bring Russia and NATO together as equal partners in 
selected areas of common interest while preserving the Alliance’s prerogative to act 
independently. Despite the new optimistic atmosphere, however, many factors could affect the 
prospects for future cooperation. These include the conflict in Chechnya, politics in the 
Balkans, Russian behavior regarding WMD and missile proliferation, and Russia’s non-
strategic nuclear forces (NSNF). 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  55 
14. SUBJECT TERMS   NATO, Russia 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES 
 
Kurt E. Fischl 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., Texas A&M University, 1995 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 











Author:  Kurt E. Fischl 
 
 








James J. Wirtz 






























This thesis examines the impact of the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism since 
11 September 2001 on relations between Russia and NATO. This campaign has provided 
opportunities to increase cooperation and enhance Russian interactions with NATO’s 
political structure. The thesis also explores the challenges that must be overcome to form 
a more constructive partnership. Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, international 
terrorism has become a topic of global concern, challenging existing international 
security structures. Within this context, the prospects for further NATO-Russia 
cooperation in building a new Euro-Atlantic security structure have dramatically 
improved. Areas of NATO-Russia cooperation in the war on terrorism include increased 
economic interactions, shared intelligence, improved military-to-military exchanges, and 
enhanced institutional arrangements. The May 2002 adoption of an “at 20” framework 
may bring Russia and NATO together as equal partners in selected areas of common 
interest while preserving the Alliance’s prerogative to act independently. Despite the new 
optimistic atmosphere, however, many factors could affect the prospects for future 
cooperation. These include the conflict in Chechnya, politics in the Balkans, Russian 
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 This thesis examines the impact of the U.S.- led “war on terrorism” since 11 
September 2001 on relations between Russia and NATO. The “war on terrorism” has 
provided opportunities to increase cooperation and enhance Russian interactions with 
NATO’s political structure. The thesis also explores the challenges that must be 
overcome to form a more constructive partnership. 
Since the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, the 
opportunities to fundamentally alter the existing security environment in Europe and 
create a more cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia have been made 
possible by moves on both sides. Using the common fight against terrorism as a basis for 
further cooperation, NATO and Russia have the opportunity to transform what has at 
times been an almost adversarial relationship. Such opportunities are rare, and this makes 
an analysis of the challenges facing the relationship of great importance and interest. 
Greater understanding of the many variables affecting the NATO-Russia relationship can 
help facilitate the development of more constructive interactions. 
International terrorism has now become an obvious topic of global concern, and it 
has challenged existing regional and international security structures. Broader 
cooperation and stronger relationships between states and their security alliances and 
institutions are needed to counter the shadowy new threat posed by global terror 
networks. These processes are affecting many relationships, including that between 
NATO, the central transatlantic security alliance, and the Russian Federation. The 
changes in the international security environment since the attacks on the United States 
have dramatically increased the prospects for further NATO-Russian cooperation in 
building a new European security structure.  
In October 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his desire to 
cultivate a more cooperative relationship with NATO and the West. This raises the 
question of the form that increased cooperation between the Alliance and Russia may 
2 
take. Will NATO’s attempts to strengthen the relationship be successful, or will they lead 
to further disillusionment and disappointment for the Allies and the Russians? 
Despite the new optimistic atmosphere generated by Putin and NATO 
representatives, including Secretary General Lord Robertson, many factors in the 
relationship could affect the prospects for future cooperation. Because the Allies could 
not in the foreseeable future fully integrate Russia in the Alliance without undermining 
its cohesiveness and its ability to act in a crisis, the concept is one of closer cooperation 
in selected areas. The challenges arise in considering how Russia and NATO could work 
more closely together without hindering the pursuit of the Alliance’s purposes. 
This thesis explores the opportunities to create a more robust and constructive 
NATO-Russia partnership as well as obstacles to this new cooperation in the wake of the 
terror attacks on the United States. It provides a qualitative analysis of selected issues 
based on primary and secondary sources. 
 Chapter II reviews the historical context and framework of the analysis based on 
the evolution of the NATO-Russia relationship from the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 
1989-1991 to 2001 before the attacks of 11 September. This review attempts to exp lain 
the historical origins of cooperation and antagonism between Russia and NATO from the  
early attempts to bring Russia into the Euro-Atlantic security community through the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), later to be restructured and replaced by the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) to 
Russia’s fears and concerns over NATO enlargement and the divisive crisis over Kosovo 
in 1999. 
Chapter III discusses the nature of the post-11 September NATO-Russia 
partnership and the factors that led to President Putin’s decision to seek a closer 
partnership. Foundations for cooperation such as increased economic interactions, shared 
intelligence, improved military-to-military exchanges, and enhanced institutional 
arrangements are then examined. 
Chapter IV focuses on the obstacles and challenges to cooperation that continue to 
complicate NATO-Russia relations despite the new opportunities to create a strengthened 
partnership and the benefits that this increased cooperation could provide. These issues 
3 
include the conflict in Chechnya and other Russian operations in the Caucasus, political 
order in the Balkans, Russian behavior regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
and missile proliferation, and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF). 
Chapter V offers conclusions and discusses the future of the NATO-Russia 







































II. THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP: 1991-2001, ORIGINS OF 
COOPERATION AND ANTAGONISM 
  
The purpose of this chapter is to review the historical context of the evolution of 
the NATO-Russia relationship during the 1990s and the period preceding the attacks of 
11 September 2001, providing a framework of analysis for the NATO-Russia partnership 
that has developed since the attacks. This chapter begins with a review of NATO’s 
transformation after the end of the Cold War, including its decision to seek cooperation 
with Russia and other former adversaries. This process of cooperation led to the policy of 
NATO enlargement.  
NATO enlargement and Russia’s various responses to it over the course of the 
decade have been central in the evolution of the relationship. This evolution has 
transpired through a series of measures such as Partnership for Peace (PfP), open to all 
former adversaries and other states in the Euro-Atlantic region, and the formation of the 
NATO-Russia  Permanent Joint Council (PJC) through the NATO-Russia Founding Act. 
NATO has sought to assuage Russian fears and concerns, and has tried to conduct its 
policies without causing serious political rifts with the Russian Federation. By the end of 
the 1990s, the process of NATO enlargement and engagement in Central and Eastern 
Europe coupled with the rapid decline of Russian power and influence left relations 
increasingly strained despite the avenues for cooperation that had been created. This 
strain in relations was further intensified during NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo 
conflict in 1999. The combination of Russian distrust over NATO’s intentions in 
enlargement, the Russian perception of increasing marginalization and disregard for 
Russian interests, and Russian opposition to NATO’s Kosovo operation threatened to 
undermine the prospects for further cooperation as the twenty-first century dawned. 
 
A. NATO’S TRANSFORMATION AND ENGAGEMENT WITH RUSSIA             
The North Atlantic Alliance guarded Western Europe from Soviet and Warsaw 
Pact forces and invasion for over forty years. It did so based on the collective defense 
commitment formulated in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. NATO’s very existence 
6 
was based on countering the threat from the east through a combination of conventional 
and nuclear capabilities for deterrence and defense. Without the external threat posed by 
the Soviet Union, the very existence of the alliance would be called into question. The 
rapid and surprising fall of the communist regimes in the Soviet bloc pushed this issue to 
the forefront in 1989-1991. If NATO was to continue to be relevant in this new, evolving 
security environment, it would have to change.     
Since the unraveling of the Soviet empire in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, the North Atlantic Alliance has undertaken a dramatic process of 
transformation in response to the changing world. No longer facing a military threat from 
the Soviet Union, NATO began to reassess its role within a radically altered European 
security environment.1  Because of this reassessment of the missions and roles of the 
Alliance, the 1990s were a period of transition. Without the threat of attack from the 
Soviet Union, NATO’s primary mission of collective defense seemed to be fading into 
irrelevance.  
The transformation during the 1990s brought NATO from an orientation focused 
mainly on collective defense to one with additional new missions within the broader 
context of what the Allies called “cooperative security” across the Euro-Atlantic region. 
One of the most important and visible of these new missions is cooperation with former 
adversaries and other non-NATO nations.2 This new mission has included institutions 
such as Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). 
The latter eventually was restructured and replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC) in 1997. NATO enlargement was also a natural outgrowth of this 
process of cooperation. At the Alliance’s 1997 Madrid Summit, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary were invited to join NATO.  
This process has led to the engagement, both direct and indirect, of the Russian 
Federation. From very early on, NATO’s policies were often ambiguous and ill-defined.  
According to a British analyst, Jonathan Eyal, 
                                                 
1 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security (Washington 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 72. 
2 Yost, NATO Transformed, p. 72. 
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The alliance tried to portray the process of enla rgement as a measured 
operation in which the credentials of each candidate state were properly 
examined in an impartial way. In fact, NATO’s enlargement was a 
haphazard affair and the semblance of unanimity which member states 
wished to project was shattered just when this unanimity mattered most. 3 
 
 This left Russia guessing about NATO’s intentions as it dealt with its own 
difficult period of imperial withdrawal and international weakness. As the communist 
regimes of Eastern Europe collapsed one after another, a political vacuum quickly 
developed in the region. The West feared that some countries in Eastern Europe might 
fall into a period of violence and lawlessness. Engagement was needed to promote 
democratization and cooperation with Western institutions. The initial Western responses 
to Eastern Europe (including the NACC and PfP) would do much to shape the process of 
NATO enlargement in the future, affecting the policies and attitudes of East European, 
Russian, and Western governments.4  
 
B. NATO ENLARGEMENT 
While the West’s initial focus was on dealing with the unification of Germany, 
Eastern Europeans began expressing their desires for integration with the West on all 
levels. Even Russia articulated long-term goals of integration with NATO in 1991.5 On 
23 December 1991, Boris Yeltsin announced that Russia had a long-term policy goal of 
joining the Alliance. This would not be the last time high-ranking Russian officials would 
make similar statements. For example, such statements were made in December 1993 by 
Boris Yeltsin, and in October 1996 by Ivan Rybkin.6 Whether these comments were 
merely symbolic gestures or represented an effort to undermine the role of the Alliance as 
a collective defense organization is debatable. However, it was obvious to all that 
                                                 
3 Jonathan Eyal, “NATO’s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision,” International Affairs Vol. 73,4, 
October 1997, p. 695. 
4 Eyal, p. 697. 
5 Caro line Kennedy-Pipe, “Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” in Mark Webber, ed., 
Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation, (London: Macmillan/St Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 48. See 
“Yeltsin Appeal to North Atlatic Cooperation Council on NATO Membership,” BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 23 December 1991. 
6 David S. Yost, “The New NATO and Collective Security,” Survival,  Summer 1998, p. 158, note 22. 
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Russian integration into NATO would fundamentally alter the function of the Alliance, 
and the concept was not taken seriously by most observers in the West at this time. The 
German Defense Minister Volker Rühe stated in 1994, “Russia cannot be integrated, 
neither into the European Union nor into NATO…if Russia were to become a member of 
NATO it would blow NATO apart…”7 
  According to Jonathan Eyal, the Western response to Eastern Europe’s desire for 
integration was luke-warm at best: “the West, as always, counselled patience; it even 
suggested that the old Warsaw Pact should be maintained, supposedly because this made 
the administration of arms control agreements easier.”8 In the realm of security issues, 
the Western governments advised the Eastern Europeans in the early 1990s that they 
should adopt a set of “interlocking institutions.” NATO’s contribution to this process was 
the NACC.  
The NACC was established in December 1991 to bring together all members of 
the Alliance with nine Central and Eastern European countries in a consultative forum. 9 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the NACC was expanded to include the 
former Soviet republics constituting the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
This forum represented NATO’s first attempt to create a formal dialogue with its former 
adversaries, and it was “conceived as a means to overcome the divisive legacy of the 
Cold War.”10 This dialogue was achieved through a series of seminars, conferences and 
workshops that discussed a wide range of issues, including peacekeeping, civil 
emergency planning, defense budgeting, and interoperability issues.11   
Despite the open and constructive dialogue generated through the NACC, its 
limitations soon became apparent as a broader level of engagement was sought 
throughout the former Soviet bloc. With the crisis in the former Yugoslavia 
demonstrating the strength and importance of NATO, calls for more robust forms of 
engagement began to take shape. First proposed by US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in 
                                                 
7 Volker Rühe as quoted in Yost, “The New NATO and Collective Security,” p. 139.  
8 Eyal. p. 699. 
9 NATO Handbook  (Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press: 2001), p. 40. 
10 Yost, NATO Transformed, p. 96 
11 Ibid, p. 95. 
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October 1993, PfP was founded in January 1994 as a vehicle to promote cooperation in 
security matters between the Alliance and individual states wishing to participate.12 The 
North Atlantic Council declaration of 11 January 1994 stated, “The Partnership will 
expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase 
stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the 
spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our  
Alliance.”13 The PfP Framework Document included the following functions to be 
performed by each participant to fulfill the objectives of the program:  
a. facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting 
processes; 
b. ensuring democratic control of defence forces; 
c. maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to 
constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN 
and/or the responsibility of the CSCE; 
d. the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the 
purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen 
their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search 
and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be 
agreed; 
e. the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to 
operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.14  
 
Founded as a vehicle to promote cooperation in security matters between the 
Alliance and individual states wishing to participate, PfP was in fact a compromise 
solution to engagement.15 It made meaningful and constructive individual partnerships 
possible, within the constructs of Individual Partnership Programs (IPPs), but it stopped 
short of incorporating the new partner states as full members of the Alliance. While PfP 
                                                 
12 Yost, NATO Transformed, p.97. 
13 North Atlantic Council declaration, January 11, 1994, par. 14. www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-
95/c940111a.htm  
14 Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, par.  3. 
15 Kennedy-Pipe, p. 52. 
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was never intended to be a program to admit new members into the Alliance, it was clear 
to most parties that it could serve to smooth and facilitate the path to membership for 
some partners.  
Led by a resurgence of nationalistic forces and continued economic decline, a 
more confrontational policy began to take root in Russia.16 Many Russians hoped that 
NATO would be regarded as a relic of the Cold War, to be replaced by new Pan-
European security institutions, and continued to view the alliance as a genuine military 
threat to Russia’s national security. 17 Russians presented several arguments against 
enlargement.18 Many Russians argued that it would create a new dividing line between 
Russia and the rest of Europe, which would isolate the country politically and 
economically. Many Russians also believed that enlargement was a betrayal of the 
promises made by the West over the terms of German reunification. Many Russian 
politicians have claimed that German Chancellor Helmut Kohl promised Russia during 
the negotiations for reunification that NATO would not expand if a reunited Germany 
was allowed to remain within the Alliance.19  Russians have also asserted that the West 
betrayed Russia when it reneged on an unwritten agreement made by President George 
Bush with Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990 that guaranteed that the West would not exploit 
Russia’s weakness for its own profit.20 Moderate Russian politicians feared that NATO 
enlargement into Eastern Europe would inflame radical nationalist elements in Russian 
politics, and would propel these nationalists and radicals into power. This fear most 
vividly manifested itself after the unexpected strong performance of Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky’s “Liberal Democratic” party in the December 1993 national elections. 
Thereafter Russian nationalist, conservative and radical views hostile to the West could 
no longer be ignored.   
Caroline Kennedy-Pipe asserts that “Moscow claimed PfP represented a success 
for Russia for it showed that western capitals had taken into account Russian objections 
                                                 
16 Ibid, p. 50. 
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid, p. 51. 
19 Eyal, p. 699. 
20 Eyal, p. 698. For further discussion of these Russian assertions, see Yost, NATO Transformed, pp. 
135-6. 
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to the expansion of NATO.”21 Russians were nonetheless still suspicious, however, with 
regard to NATO’s intentions for future enlargement. Some Russians saw PfP not as a 
means of permanently postponing enlargement, but as a foundation whereby some states 
could develop closer links with the alliance and eventually join. These suspicions and 
mistrust of NATO delayed the cultivation of a more cooperative relationship. Russia 
postponed participation through its own Individual Partnership Program (IPP) until 
1995.22 Russian participation in PfP has nonetheless been minimal, limited mainly to 
non-military matters such as civil-emergency issues.23 This low level of participation can 
be explained partly by Russian sentiment toward PfP typified by a statement made by 
Vladimir Lukin:  
If the intention of this formula [PfP] is to defer the East European 
countries’ affiliation to NATO, ‘Partnership’ should be welcomed. If the 
intention is to anesthetize Russia for the period that its Eastern neighbors 
are being dragged into NATO, Russia’s refusal to undergo such anesthesia 
should be clearly and definitely stated.”24   
 
Lukin’s comments reveal the basic misunderstanding about NATO enlargement 
shared by many Russians. Countries were not “being dragged into NATO,” but were 
eagerly seeking membership in the Alliance. Above all, the Alliance had not considered 
the enlargement process as directed in any way against Russia’s security interests. 
In other respects, however, Russian suspicions and concerns were well- founded. 
PfP did not put to rest the issue of enlargement. Many Central and East European states 
did view PfP as a vehicle for movement toward full membership in the alliance. Military-
to-military contacts and cooperation could facilitate the eventual integration of a partner 
state’s armed forces into the Alliance’s military structure. Despite Russian objections and 
proposals for alternative security structures, many East European states continued to push 
for membership in NATO.25 
                                                 
21 Kennedy-Pipe, p. 52. 
22 Yost, NATO Transformed, p. 136. 
23 Ibid 
24 Vladimir Lukin as quoted in Yost, NATO Transformed, p. 136. 
25 Kennedy-Pipe, p. 53. 
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Owing in part to such pressures, the United States began in 1993-1994 to openly 
endorse the principle of enlargement.26 This process culminated at the July 1997 NATO 
Summit in Madrid when the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were formally invited 
to join the alliance. The path to enlargement was paved, however, by the signing of the 
“Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security” between Russia and 
NATO in May 1997. The Founding Act established the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint 
Council (PJC), which would serve as a consultative body between NATO and Moscow 
and which would be used to resolve disagreements. Russia was also invited to send an 
ambassador and liaison team to NATO headquarters in Brussels. Russians believed that 
Moscow was finally getting a means to influence the NATO decision-making process. 
The signing of the Act reflected a shift in Russian policy. Moscow began to concede the 
inevitability of NATO enlargement, but wished to gain as many concessions from NATO 
as possible.27 While Moscow would accept NATO enlargement, it would draw a “red 
line” around former Soviet republics, precluding them from future membership. This 
Russian policy has increasingly led to confrontation over the prospective NATO 
membership of the Baltic states. 
 
C. THE KOSOVO CRISIS  
Russia soon discovered the limits of the PJC’s utility during the Kosovo crisis in 
1999. When the Rambouillet negotiations broke down in 1999 after a long period of 
Russian resistance to Western pressures on Belgrade to accept a settlement to the crisis, 
NATO’s military campaign began. Russia harshly denounced NATO’s use of force. 
Russian leaders were apparently more disturbed by the precedent that the action might 
create than motivated by concern for the Serbs. Russia failed to influence NATO’s 
decisions during the crisis, and Russians claim that Moscow was not even consulted 
through the PJC, merely informed of decisions already made.28 Colonel-General Leonid 
Ivashov, an official in the Defense Ministry, stated, “NATO ha[d] negated the 
                                                 
26 Roland Dannreuther, “Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO-Russian Relations.” Survival, vol. 
41, Winter 1999-2000, p. 152.  
27 Kennedy-Pipe, p. 56. 
28 Ibid, p. 60. 
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fundamental principles upon which Russia’s relations with this bloc were based.”29 The 
Kosovo crisis strained NATO-Russian relations to new lows. Russia suspended its 
meager participation in PfP, recalled its representatives from NATO headquarters, and 
suspended the PJC.  
Although a warming of NATO-Russia relations has occurred since early 2000, the 
balance between cooperation and confrontation has been unpredictable and in constant 
flux. Russian politicians have sought to balance popular anti-Western sentiments with 
Russia’s need for Western aid and support. Understanding this balance, Russian officials 
have sought after every crisis to patch up relations with the West.30           
 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
NATO’s efforts to develop an open and constructive relationship with Russia 
have been less than fully successful. NATO has courted Russian cooperation, but in 
Russian eyes the Alliance has often disregarded Russian concerns. NATO’s efforts to 
bring East-Central and Southeastern Europe into the Euro-Atlantic security framework 
through PfP and (in selected cases) the more politically controversial means of 
enlargement have risked the alienation of Russia, which continues to view NATO 
suspiciously and as a potential threat to its national security. Bringing the fo rmer Warsaw 
Pact nations and potentially also former Soviet republics into NATO is intended to 
promote stability and to lay the foundations for security and prosperity throughout the  
Euro-Atlantic region in the Western view. In a widespread Russian view, however, this  
process threatens Russia with encirclement, isolation from the West, and an expansion of 
the Alliance’s sphere of influence at Russia’s expense.31  
The first wave of post-Cold War NATO enlargement and the prospects for further 
rounds have left many Russians bitter. Furthermore, the NATO operation against 
Yugoslavia in 1999 did much to confirm Russian fears about NATO’s true ambitions, 
raising greater obstacles to NATO-Russian cooperation and threatening to undo the 
progress developed through institutions such as PfP and the PJC.   
                                                 
29 Ivashov quoted in  Kennedy-Pipe, p. 61. 
30 Dannreuther, p. 147. 



























III.  11 SEPTEMBER 2001 AND NATO-RUSSIA COOPERATION IN 
THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM  
 
In the morning hours of September 11, 2001, two hijacked commercial jetliners 
slammed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City in an act that 
killed over 3,000 individuals. Another commandeered aircraft, as part of the coordinated 
attack, plowed into a wing of the Pentagon, killing 184 Department of Defense 
employees. Only the heroic actions of passengers in a fourth aircraft prevented yet 
another attack on another Washington D.C. landmark. These calculated and deliberate 
attacks sent shock waves around the world and signaled the presence of new dangers in 
the international security environment. 
International terrorism has now been recognized as a global threat, challenging 
existing international security structures. In this new environment, broader cooperation 
and stronger relationships between states and alliances, including NATO, are needed to 
counter the shadowy new threat posed by global terror networks. The changed global 
political and security environments since the attacks on the United States have 
dramatically improved the prospects for greater NATO-Russian cooperation in building a 
new European security structure. 
Visiting NATO headquarters in the wake of the attacks, as part of a two day 
summit organized by the European Union, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that 
Russia was prepared to reconsider its opposition to NATO enlargement including former 
republics of the Soviet Union in an effort to transform its security relationship with the 
West.32 Putin stated:  
If NATO takes on a different shade and is becoming a political 
organization, of course we would reconsider our position with regard to 
such expansion, if we are to feel involved in such processes. They keep 
saying that NATO is becoming more political than military. We are 
                                                 
32 William Drozdiak, “Putin Eases Stance on NATO Expansion, Closer Security Ties with West 
Pursued,” The Washington Post, October 4, 2001. 
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looking at this and watching this process. If this is to be so, it would 
change things considerably. 33  
 
Putin also declared Russia’s support and cooperation for the US war on global 
terror networks, to include thwarting terrorist financing, intelligence sharing and tracking 
WMD proliferation. 34 
These discussions placed Russia, long at the margins of Western security 
frameworks, firmly in the Western camp in the war against terrorism. In the optimistic 
mood of the moment, NATO Secretary General Robertson stated, “These discussions 
mark a major milestone in the NATO-Russia relationship. We have identified a number 
of new areas where NATO and Russia can work together.”35  
These statements could mark the beginning of a new era and usher in a level of 
unprecedented cooperation between Russia and NATO. Secretary General Robertson 
stated: 
For some forty years NATO and Russia sat and glowered at each other, for 
another ten years we tip-toed around each other but now I believe that we 
are entering an era where substantial and practical cooperation is going to 
build a unique relationship between us.36  
 
This cooperation could lead to a fundamental change in the European security 
environment, and it could eventually make way for some form of Russian integration 
with NATO. While not asking for immediate membership in the alliance, Putin did state 
that Russia should be a “primary NATO ally.”37 Neither Putin nor Roberston stated that 
they saw any reason why Russia should not be a member of NATO eventually.38 This 
raises the question of the form the increased cooperation between the Alliance and Russia 
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may take. The recent decision to create a new Russia-NATO council “at 20” addresses 
this question.  
In May 2002, the North Atlantic Council made the following announcement:  
We welcome the decisive and substantial deepening of the NATO-Russia 
relationship, which marks an historic step towards the Alliance’s long-
standing goal of building a secure, cooperative and democratic Euro-
Atlantic area. We look forward to the approval this afternoon by the 
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council of the document on the creation of 
the NATO-Russia Council, where NATO member states and Russia will 
work as equal partners in areas of common interest, while preserving 
NATO’s prerogative to act independently. The document will be adopted 
and signed at the inaugural session of the Council, to be held at a Summit 
meeting of Heads of State and Government in Rome on 28 May. We are 
confident that the creation of the Council will lend new impetus and 
substance to our partnership with Russia, and make a substantial 
contribution to our common goal of a stable, peaceful and undivided 
Europe, as enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.39 
 
   
The exact working of this new structure in practice is nonetheless still unclear, 
and many critical questions remain unanswered. To what extent will Russia engage in 
important and substantial participation that goes beyond the limited achievements of the 
PJC? To what extent, if any, will Russia be granted meaningful decision-making powers 
in cooperation with the Alliance while remaining outside NATO? While there are more 
questions than answers for many of these issues of cooperation at this early stage, work 
has been underway to define answers since late 2001.40  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the effects of the September 2001 
attacks on the NATO-Russia relationship. The chapter explores the factors behind Putin’s 
decision to form a strategic partnership with the West in the wake of the attacks and the 
prospects for a broader, more cooperative relationship between Russia and NATO. 
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A. PUTIN’S DECISION AND THE NEW PARTNERSHIP WITH NATO 
In the hours after the attacks on the United States, Russian President Putin 
telephoned President Bush not only to offer his support and friendship, but also to inform 
the U.S. President that Russia was canceling military exercises planned in the Pacific.41 
These exercises would have involved strategic aircraft probing the outer edges of North 
American airspace. The cancellation of the exercise was significant because it allowed 
valuable North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) assets to be 
reallocated for the defense of the US homeland in response to the terrorist attacks.  
Putin would be the first head of state to call Bush. On 11 and 12 September, the 
two discussed methods of cooperation in the combat against international terrorism. 42  A 
US official described these conversations as setting a radically different tone in relations 
with Russia : “I think there is a historic opportunity but it can be missed.”43 From these 
beginnings, Russia has embarked on a broad-based and dramatic effort to increase its 
cooperation with the West. This cooperation could transform Russia’s relationship with 
the West, and it has already placed Russia firmly in the Western camp in the war against 
terrorism.  
This represents a radical shift in Russian foreign policy. Despite various 
government declarations to the contrary, key elites in Russia have continued to view 
NATO as an adversary. Russian society has generally agreed in viewing NATO 
expansion as a threat to the country’s security. While Putin made overtures to the West, 
suggesting broader Russian participation in European and Euro-Atlantic institutions in 
2000 and 2001, his vision did not involve expanded Russian engagement with NATO, 
but new European political and security institutions in which Russia could be an equal 
member. On 3 September 2001, during a visit to Finland and just one week before the 
terrorist attacks, commenting on the possible inclusion of the Baltic states in the Alliance, 
Putin declared that NATO enlargement was a risky mistake and that the Alliance did not 
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enhance the security of Europe. “Pushing NATO’s limits to Russia does not create a 
universal security in Europe, it does not solve any key issue in Europe.”44      
Putin’s visits with leaders of the EU, NATO, and the United States since 
September 2001 have laid the foundation for further cooperation with the West and could 
alter the relationship between Russia and NATO. This could have a fundamental impact 
on the security and stability of Europe and perhaps the world. As NATO invoked the 
collective defense clause in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Putin offered his support 
in waging the war against global terrorism. Putin stated in Houston on 15 November 
2001, “We are prepared to expand cooperation with NATO and we are prepared to go as 
far as the Atlantic alliance is prepared to go.”45 The forms of support offered include 
increased economic cooperation (with greater Western access to Russian oil and natural 
gas reserves), shared intelligence, diplomatic initiatives facilitating US access to Central 
Asia, military- to-military interactions, and enhanced Russian roles in cooperation with 
the North Atlantic Alliance. 
Putin made his bold overtures to the West in an adverse domestic political 
environment. Most Duma leaders were only partially supportive of joining the anti-terror 
coalition, while many elites involved with national security were hostile to the concept. 
54 percent of the Russian public favored Russian neutrality, while 70 percent felt that 
Russia should deny American forces access to Central Asia, according to a public opinion 
poll.46  Thus, Putin’s pro-Western stance threatens to enrage many in the Russian ruling 
elite. Sentiments within Russia’s elite circles have grown increasingly anti-Western in 
recent years as Russia has continued to struggle with its economic problems and with 
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B. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PUTIN’S DECISION 
1. Mutual Strategic Interests 
With Russian opinion less than fully supportive of increased cooperation with the 
West, why did Putin act in this manner? It appears that he acted in accordance with his 
interpretation of Russia’s interests. First and most important are Russia’s security 
interests. By sid ing with the United States and NATO, Russia gets help in countering 
Islamic militancy on its southern flank. Because the Russians lack the capability to 
eliminate the threat on their own, support for the American effort is consistent with 
Russian security interests.48 Putin appears to have made the decision to place Russia’s 
security policy in a firm Westward orientation. NATO Secretary General Robertson 
commented on Russia’s decision to move toward NATO as follows:  
I want to make it very clear that NATO and Russia are in partnership 
together for good, cool-headed reasons, because it’s in the interest of 
Russia and the interest of NATO that we build that relationship. Russia 
wants to have a more secure and stable world outside and NATO wants a 
degree of predictability and stability in how it deals with Russia both now 
and into the future.49 
 
2. The War in Chechnya 
 Another reason for Putin’s alignment of Russia with the West in the struggle 
against terrorism is that it helps to justify Russia’s war in Chechnya and mutes Western 
criticism over Russian prosecution of the war.50  Russia can now claim that it is fighting 
against a common enemy as it attempts to destroy the bands of international Islamic 
terrorists operating in Chechnya and beyond. This seemed to be working even as early as 
September 2001, when German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder began calling for a milder 
view of Russia’s role in Chechnya: “Regarding Chechnya, there will be and must be a 
more differentiated evaluation in world opinion.”51 Some observers speculate that 
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Russia’s possible decision to expand its military campaign to include the destruction of 
Chechen training camps in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge may be welcomed and supported by 
the West if it is coordinated with the Georgian government and possibly the US military. 
The deployment of US special forces to the region to train the Georgian military in 
counterinsurgency operations has highlighted the strategic importance the West is 
beginning to place on the region, which has fallen under scrutiny in the hunt for the  
remaining international terrorist bases of operations.52  
3. Economic Support 
While Putin’s overtures were not made on a quid pro quo basis, the implications 
of broader engagement with the West could manifest themselves in the economic sphere. 
Putin hopes to improve Russia’s financial status by gaining some relief from foreign debt 
and faster entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) may be realized because of 
his policies.53 Putin’s meetings with EU officials resulted in promises of the acceleration 
of Russia’s bid to join the WTO, a process that has been delayed for over a year.54 
Membership in the WTO would be highly valuable for Russia in its relations with the EU 
because the EU has emerged as Russia’s key trading partner.55  
 
C. FOUNDATIONS FOR NATO-RUSSIA COOPERATION IN THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM    
Putin has realized that these benefits can only be achieved through closer 
cooperation with the United States, its European allies, and NATO’s Euro-Atlantic 
security structures. The events of 11 September 2001 presented him with an opportunity 
to bring Russia from the margins of Europe not only into the European mainstream as an 
important and productive player, but as a constructive member of the Euro-Atlantic 
community as well. According to Celeste A. Wallander of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies in Washington, “Putin has changed the objective—he wants to be 
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one of the Europeans cooperating with the United States. He and his advisors have 
concluded that’s better than being on the outside.”56  
1. Increased Economic Cooperation 
As part of its cooperation with the West, Russia hopes to foster increased trade. 
To help achieve these ends, Russia has put itself in a position to exploit its vast oil and 
natural gas reserves and offer them as an alternative to reliance on resources in the 
Middle East. Producing one-tenth of the world’s oil supply and one-third of its natural 
gas, Russia has become a critical exporter of energy resources and could function as a 
safer and more reliable partner than Middle Eastern states.57 Russia, in fact, finds itself in 
the unique position of being able to offset Saudi Arabia’s dominant position in the global 
energy market and could hypothetically displace OPEC as the most important energy 
supplier to the West. Through aggressive development of Russia’s energy reserves 
resulting in an over one million barrel per day (mmd) increase since 1999, the Russian 
government has placed itself in a position to “assume a far more significant position in 
the world petroleum sector than ever before.” 58 According to Edward L. Morse and 
James Richard: 
Moscow’s political leaders, as well as its corporate leaders in oil and gas, 
are portraying Russia’s oil firms as stable sources of supply, willing to add 
output to the market to keep prices reasonable and thus revive the global 
economy. In the eyes of these leaders, the new geopolitics of energy can 
help Moscow gain both economically and politically. In economic terms, 
energy production lets Russia integrate itself into the industrialized West. 
In political terms, energy resources can be used to buttress Moscow’s goal 
of becoming a key partner of the United States. 59 
 
Russia has increased its market share at OPEC’s expense and it is increasingly 
resilient against market manipulation and price fixing by the cartel. With the building of 
major pipelines through the Caspian basin and the Transcaucasus, Russia’s energy 
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resources are now increasingly available to the West. Such an arrangement could 
promote a higher level of interdependence, and thereby help Russia gain closer ties with 
the EU, a goal it has been pursuing. 60 More extensive economic interactions with the 
West could translate into closer cooperation in other areas, including security. 
2. Shared Intelligence, Broader Diplomacy, and Military Cooperation 
The most important aspects of Russia-NATO cooperation in the “war against 
terrorism” include diplomatic, intelligence, and military activities. The ability of 
American troops to use bases in Central Asia and to overfly Russian territory would be 
critical in any war effort in Afghanistan. Russian cooperation and diplomatic support in 
gaining access to bases in the Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, 
where thousands of US personnel have been stationed for both combat and non-combat 
operations, have been essential in the war effort.  
Russian cooperation on the military front has been meaningful and 
unprecedented. In a 24 September 2001 television address, Putin offered military support 
for the US campaign, to include search and rescue operations, use of Russian airspace, 
and weapons transfers to Afghan opposition forces.61 Russia has supplied the Afghan 
Northern Alliance many of its heavy weapons. Rumors of further Russian military 
assistance have persisted, including reports of the United States hiring experienced 
Russian mercenaries to fight in Afghanistan. 62  
Perhaps the most important component of Russian cooperation, however, has 
been the sharing of intelligence. During a 5 November 2001 visit by Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld to Russia, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov confirmed Russian 
cooperation in the intelligence field: “To a large extent, it [cooperation] concerns 
Russia’s use of special services and here I cannot comment any further.”63 This 
intelligence has reportedly come in the form of more precise targeting information. 64 The 
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Russians have helped identify caves, tunnels and command centers known to be used by 
Afghan Taliban forces. An unnamed Pentagon official stated, “The Russians are being 
very helpful. There’s a lot of stuff coming in. The problem now is sifting through it.”65 
 
D. STRENGTHENING RUSSIAN COOPERATION WITH NATO 
INSTITUTIONS 
These areas of cooperation are laying the framework for broader Russian 
interactions with NATO and have been critical in the campaign against the terror 
networks. Secretary General Robertson stated on 4 February 2002, “Intensified NATO-
Russia cooperation is a central pillar of the global struggle against terrorism. Without 
close cooperation between Europe’s two major security players, no anti-terrorism 
strategy can work.”66 In order to institutionalize this cooperation and transform the 
NATO-Russia relationship for the long run, Russian interactions with the Alliance will 
have to be strengthened. On 14 May 2002, the NAC and representatives from Russia 
agreed to fundamentally alter the existing mechanisms for cooperation, going beyond the 
framework created through PfP and the PJC. They approved the creation of the NATO-
Russia Council, which will replace and broaden the functions of the PJC, giving Russia a 
voice as an equal partner in selected areas of common interest. This new framework goes 
beyond the old mechanisms to provide broader means of institutionalizing cooperation. In 
his speech before the German Bundestag on 25 September 2001, Putin explained the 
problems of continuing on the same path regarding NATO and the need for a new and  
broader form of participation for Russia:  
Despite all the positive things that have been achieved over the past 
decades, we have not yet managed to work out an efficient mechanism for 
cooperation. The coordination organs, which have been established so far, 
do not give Russia any real opportunity to participate in the preparation of 
decisions. Nowadays, decisions are sometimes made without [consulting] 
us at all, and then we are emphatically asked to approve them. Then there 
is once again talk about loyalty to NATO; it is even said that without 
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Russia it would be impossible to implement these decisions. We wonder 
whether this is normal, whether this is a real partnership.67  
 
The discussions about transforming the relationship have centered on a November 
2001 proposal presented by British Prime Minister Tony Blair.68 Blair’s proposal has 
called for the creation of a new “Russia-North Atlantic Council” (RNAC). The RNAC 
might be used to coordinate policies in areas such as peacekeeping in the Balkans, civil 
emergency planning, defense modernization, and WMD proliferation. 69 Such an 
arrangement would move beyond the PJC, and give Russia an equal voice on specific 
issues. Instead of a traditional “19 + 1” arrangement, an approach institutionalized in 
mechanisms such as the PfP and the PJC, the RNAC would treat all twenty participants 
on an equal basis.70  
This proposed arrangement has generated positive reactions. The proposal was 
not only endorsed at a meeting of the PJC, where NATO and Russian representatives 
agreed that development of an “at 20” framework would be pursued, but at the foreign 
minister level in the NAC.71 Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stated: 
Russia does not raise the question of joining the North Atlantic alliance; at 
the same time, we are prepared to cooperate with it in areas of shared 
interest. The experience of the last decade proves that such cooperation 
can be effective only if it is based on the principles of equality. Hence the 
idea of creating a mechanism of cooperation within the framework of “the 
20” –the NATO member nations and Russia—which can provide joint 
development and implementation of decisions in the fight against 
terrorism and in responding to other contemporary challenges.72 
 
                                                 
67 Vladimir Putin, “Putin addresses German parliament in Russian and then German,” BBC 
Monitoring International Reports, September 25, 2001. 
68“Russia-NATO Talks: In Veto Veritas?” Monitor-A Daily Briefing on the Former Soviet States. Vol 
VII, Issue 218, November 28, 2001. (www.jamestown.org)  
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Patrick E. Tyler, “Gingerly, NATO Plans Broader Role for Moscow,” New York Times, 07 
December 2001. 
72 Igor S. Ivanov, “Organizing the World to Fight Terror,” New York Times, 27 January 2002. 
26 
This brings up the issue of whether Russia would be given a form of veto power 
over NATO decisions. Such an arrangement could leave many Eastern European 
countries such as the Baltic states extremely uncomfortable as they seek full membership 
in the alliance. It could also throw into question NATO’s continuing mission as a 
collective defense organization. The NAC has attempted to address this issue by 
specifying the topics that NATO and Russia would deal with on an “at 20” basis. Danish 
Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller said, “They cannot get a veto about enlargement.”73 
Moreover, Secretary General Robertson stated that the Alliance would retain its ability to 
undertake independent action.74   
 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, Russia and NATO have moved to form a 
constructive partnership based on shared strategic and economic interests that could 
fundamentally alter the nature of the NATO-Russia relationship that has developed since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Putin’s bold overtures to the West have made 
possible an unprecedented level of cooperation in the war on terrorism, contributing to 
the successes the United States and its allies have achieved in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 
The cooperation between NATO and Russia in the ongoing conflict has provided the 
impetus to alter the institutional mechanisms defining the relationship. The concept of “at 
20” interaction in a new Russian-NATO council provides means to expand cooperation 
beyond the parameters of the present conflict, and it may address Russian concerns over 
NATO without undermining NATO’s primary role as a collective defense organization.  
Questions still remain, however, concerning the exact ins titutional mechanisms of 
cooperation. For instance, how will the new structures handle Russian disagreements 
within the “at 20” framework? Secretary General Robertson’s statements about retaining 
NATO’s ability to take independent action even within the context of the new agreed 
framework suggest that much work has yet to be done regarding true Russian integration 
into the West. Despite this, steps have been taken that could lead to profound changes in 
the Euro-Atlantic security environment.  
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   IV. OBSTACLES AND CHALLENGES TO COOPERATION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine several divisive issues that continue to 
present problems in the NATO-Russia relationship. How might these issues affect the 
prospects for strengthened NATO-Russia relations in the post-11 September 2001 
context? Since the early 1990s, these issues have been recurring obstacles to a more 
cooperative relationship between the Alliance and Russia. These obstacles to cooperation 
have been manifest in the often adversarial attitude toward NATO expressed by Russians. 
NATO has sought since 1991 to adapt to new security requirements and has accepted 
new roles and members, while Russia has dealt with the loss of its empire, economic 
disarray and internal strife. The obstacles to cooperation have reflected ingrained mistrust 
between Russia and the Alliance, as they have struggled to redefine themselves in a new 
security environment. Animosity and mistrust were never fully surmounted during the 
transformational decade of the 1990s, and they continue to present challenges for broader 
Russian integration into Euro-Atlantic security institutions. These adversarial attitudes 
and various specific obstacles must be overcome to achieve broader integration for 
Russia.    
These obstacles continue to complicate NATO-Russia relations today despite the 
new opportunities to create a strengthened partnership and the shared interests that have 
supported enhanced cooperation since 11 September 2001. The selected issues to be 
discussed are all problems that have created serious disagreements between NATO and 
Russia. They include the Russian involvement in the conflict in Chechnya and elsewhere 
in the Caucasus, political order in the Balkans, Russian behavior and policies regarding 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile proliferation, and Russia’s non-
strategic nuclear forces (NSNF) and arms control.  
 
A. CHECHNYA AND ELSEWHERE IN THE CAUCASUS 
A major obstacle to a more cooperative NATO-Russia relationship since 1994 has 
been Russian behavior in Chechnya and other areas of the Caucasus. The origins of the 
first Russian intervention in Chechnya in 1994 included political maneuverings by the 
28 
Yeltsin regime and the conviction that the drive for Chechen independence led by 
General Dzhokhar Dudayev represented a genuine threat to the authority and territorial 
integrity of the Russian Federation. 75 The subsequent Russian invasion, both massive and 
brutal, claimed the lives of thousands of civilians. The almost indiscriminate killing of 
Chechen civilians by the Russian military left the Russians with little support or 
sympathy from the West. Western objections to the use of indiscriminate force were 
repeated when the second war in Chechnya began in 1999.   
The origins of the second Russian intervention in Chechnya are murkier. Some 
observers attribute it to the rise of Islamic militancy and/or Chechen terrorism inside 
Russia. According to one interpretation, the war was a result of a deal between Prime 
Minister Putin and the General Staff. A short victorious war would give Putin popularity 
and credibility and ensure favorable results in the December 1999 elections for the Duma, 
paving the way for his election as president in March 2000. The military in return would 
get a higher profile, more autonomy, and increased defense spending. 76 
 Regardless of the political maneuverings within the Russian government, the 
situation in Chechnya had clearly deteriorated to a point of crisis by 1999. Following 
Russia’s defeat in August 1996 during the first Chechen war and the eviction of Russian 
forces from Grozny, an uneasy peace was established in the region. 77 Weary of war, the 
Russians withdrew completely from Chechnya, leaving the region to competing warlords 
and banditry. The threats Russia faced from this destabilized region subsequently 
mounted. Foreign Islamic militants from the Middle East took advantage of the instability 
and moved into Chechnya.  
The period from 1996 to 1999 was a bloody one for Russia. A pattern of banditry, 
kidnapping, and bombings inside Chechnya, in the border region, and inside Russia itself 
claimed 1,300 Russian lives.78 It is still not clear who was responsible for these attacks, 
but the Russians began to use them as a pretext for renewed intervention in the region. 
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Evidence suggests that the Russian military had already formulated an invasion plan 
when Islamic fighters from Chechnya invaded neighboring Daghestan. 79 This incursion 
into Daghestan helped remove any lingering public opposition to renewed military 
operations in the region. Russia’s response was a massive invasion of Chechnya aimed at 
reconquering and pacifying the lawless semi-state under the guise of an “anti-terror 
operation.” In November 1999, Vladimir Putin, then Prime Minister, declared, “From the 
moral point of view, our position is absolutely transparent and substantiated. We shall 
never sit down at the negotiating table with bandits.”80 However, the campaign, which 
was initially backed by broad popular support in Russia, has deteriorated into a bitter 
guerrilla war. Russian operations have been conducted with unrestrained brutality against 
the Chechen population, resulting in the death and displacement of untold numbers of 
Chechen civilians.81 According to Anatol Lieven, “Hundreds of civilian deaths as a result 
of the Russian bombardment [of the Chechen capital, Grozny,] had already occurred by 
the first week of November [1999].”82 
The Western response to the Russian campaign since 1999 has been extremely 
critical, as during the 1994-1996 conflict. Until the reformulation of Western views began 
in September 2001, most Western governments and expert observers agreed that Russian 
behavior in Chechnya involved grave human rights abuses, including indiscriminate 
bombing of civilian targets, torture and murder.83 Russia has attempted to limit Western 
knowledge about events in Chechnya by placing restrictions on press coverage and 
constraining access to Chechnya by organizations such as the OSCE and the UN, steps 
that have also attracted criticism. Because of these reported abuses by Russia, rifts in the  
relationship between Russia and the West have been opened, affecting the Russian 
attitude regarding cooperation with NATO. The Alliance has also been at the forefront of 
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opposition to Russian actions in Chechnya. In May 2000, the NAC issued the following 
statement: 
We remain deeply concerned about the ongoing conflict in Chechnya, in 
particular the difficult situation of displaced persons and reports of 
widespread human rights violations by all sides and disproportionate and 
indiscriminate use of Russian military force.84 
  
B. THE BALKANS 
Conflicting interests in the Balkans have at times constituted another obstacle to 
cooperation between NATO and Russia. Russian interests in the region stem from two 
historical factors: (a) strategic and (b) religious and cultural. 85 Russia’s traditional 
strategic interests in the region have been the security and stability of its frontiers and the 
blocking and balancing of the expansion of other great powers.86 The religious and  
cultural or “Pan-Slavic” interest has always been relegated to a secondary or supporting 
interest. Some Russian observers have viewed NATO as an instrument of U.S. power and 
to a lesser extent evidence of German resurgence in Europe. Because of this distrust of 
the Alliance, Russia has sought to limit its roles and influence in the region, to include 
opposing the interventions the Alliance undertook in Bosnia and Kosovo.87 According to 
F. Stephen Larrabee, Russian policy in the Balkans has stemmed from several strategic 
objectives: 
(a) to prevent Russia’s diplomatic isolation and avoid an open break with 
the West; (b) to defuse and deflect pressure from both the nationalists and 
the pro-Serb lobby in the Duma; (c) to ensure that Russia remains a major 
player in the Balkan game; (d) to prevent NATO from ‘imposing’ a 
solution that would exclude Russia; (e) to ensure that the UN, where 
Russia is a member of the Security Council, is the main international 
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forum for discussion and implementation of policy towards the former 
Yugoslavia; and (f) to prevent a spillover of the fighting.88 
 
The history of Russia-NATO interaction in the region shows this clear pattern. 
After a period of relatively constructive cooperation in the Balkans, which began before 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and continued through mid-1992, and which included 
efforts by both sides to contain the growing conflict in Yugoslavia and avoid the state’s 
disintegration, Western relations with Russia regarding the region began to be strained.89 
Strengthened by difficulties in liberalization and democratization and the continued 
decline of the Russia economy, conservative political forces began to gain strength on the 
Russian domestic political scene. Russian policy increasingly became pro-Serb, anti-
NATO, and uncooperative with the West. The Russian military made secret arrangements 
in 1993 to supply the Serbs with tanks and surface-to-air missiles in violation of the UN 
arms embargo, according to British defense reports.90 Throughout the Bosnia conflict, 
Russian arms continued to flow to Serbian forces covertly, while Russia began to openly 
support the Serbs on the diplomatic front.91 
Despite Russian sympathies for the Serbs, Russia’s main goal in the Balkans was 
to prevent NATO from imposing its solutions to the conflict, thus marginalizing Russian 
influence in the region. 92 This intention can be inferred from Russia’s critical reactions to 
the NATO-imposed heavy weapon exclusion zone around Sarajevo and the NATO air 
strikes against Bosnian Serb positions. Russian’s presentation of alternative face-saving 
measures to the Serbs demonstrated Moscow’s desire to be taken seriously as a major 
international player in the region. 93 
The pattern of Russian behavior continued into the Kosovo crisis in 1998-1999. 
During the period leading up to the Rambouillet discussions, Russian diplomats resisted 
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Western initiatives to formulate a compromise solution to the conflict and were 
considered successes if they postponed discussions to future meetings.94 While some 
Russian policy-makers harbored anti-Western and pan-Slavic sentiments, others 
expressed no love for Milosevic and his cohorts, but instead were motivated by a desire 
to protect and preserve Russian influence in the region. 95 Furthermore, Russia did 
nothing to discourage or moderate Serbian actions in Kosovo and continued to support 
the Yugoslav delegation at Rambouillet despite its obstructive behavior. Russian actions 
in effect amounted to a green light for continued Serbian operations against the ethnic 
Albanian Kosovar population.  
The Russian reaction to the NATO intervention in the Kosovo conflict, Operation 
Allied Force in March-June 1999, was especially hostile. It created a large lingering rift 
in the relationship, evident in Russia’s temporary suspension of the PJC. The NATO 
intervention stirred up anti-American and anti-Western sentiments, and influential 
Russians drew parallels between Kosovo and Chechnya.96 Some Russians feared that the 
Kosovo campaign would be used as a model for NATO intervention within former Soviet 
territory or within Russia itself–in Chechnya.97 Prominent Russians argued that NATO’s 
intervention in the Kosovo conflict fundamentally undermined the emerging security 
framework established under the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and threatened the 
future of NATO-Russian relations. These fears led the Russians to transform their 
military doctrine, which in April 2000 named NATO in no uncertain terms as Russia’s 
chief military concern and potential future opponent.98  
References to NATO’s Kosovo operation can be found in the doctrine, which 
states that one of the main “destabilizing” influences upon the current military-political 
situation has been “the utilization of military-force actions as a means of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ without the sanction of the UN Security Council, in circumvention of the 
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generally accepted principles and norms of international law.”99 Furthermore, the 
doctrine states that one of the main external threats to the Russian Federation resides in 
“the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russian 
Federation’s military security.”100 
Russia’s participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia 
(Stabilization Force, or SFOR) and Kosovo (Kosovo Force, or KFOR) may well be 
intended to enable Moscow to influence events on the ground. Given the anti-NATO tone 
of Russian policy, it may seem odd that the Russians would cooperate in the NATO-led 
peacekeeping forces. However, the Russians have given several reasons for their 
participation. 101 First and most importantly, participation is justified by the fact that 
Russian involvement prevents NATO from unilaterally setting up a permanent military 
presence in the region. Participation is also justified by the belief that it reaffirms 
Russia’s own interest in the Balkans by protecting the Serb population in Kosovo, thus 
preserving Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. In short, it establishes a level of influence on 
the ground; there would be none without participation. 
 
C. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION 
One of the most divisive and dangerous issues in recent decades has been 
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery 
methods. The debate has taken on new urgency since the September 2001 attacks on the 
United States, owing to fears of WMD technology falling into the hands of terrorists. 
Russia’s technology transfers and assistance to states hostile to the West that seek WMD 
capabilities have been at the forefront of debates over this issue. Russia’s behavior has 
raised serious concerns over its commitment to the global non-proliferation regime. The 
issue extends beyond the security and control of nuclear warheads, fissile materials, and 
sensitive technologies in Russia. It also encompasses technology transfers in violation of 
international agreements.    
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Recognizing the dangers posed by WMD proliferation, the Alliance at the 1999 
Washington Summit rededicated itself to counter the spread of WMD and related 
technologies.102 The Allies “initiated a more vigorous and structured debate on WMD 
issues.”103 According to the “Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction,” NATO’s principal goal is to “prevent proliferation from occurring or, 
should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means.”104 Such activities, including 
strict adherence to the various non-proliferation regimes, make NATO an important 
vehicle to promote non-proliferation in interactions with Russia. 
Much of the West’s coordination and cooperation with Russia goes through 
NATO, because the Alliance offers an institutional structure to engage the Russian 
Federation in the context of Euro-Atlantic security. NATO’s Senior Defense Group on 
Proliferation (DGP) has become critically important in this engagement. Established in 
1994 to recommend improvements in NATO’s defense posture to counter emerging 
threats posed by WMD proliferation, the DGP has been utilized to formulate NATO’s 
counter-proliferation initiative, which serves as a basis for discussions with Russia in 
forums such as PfP.105  
Despite Russia’s official acceptance of various non-proliferation and export 
control regimes, serious problems persist. Russia’s behavior indicates that Moscow is not 
yet as fully committed to non-proliferation as it claims to be. Evidence shows that 
Russian organizations, commercial and governmental, continue to engage in WMD and 
missile technology transfers to several foreign governments. 
One of the major sources of income for the Russian government in the 1990s has 
been the sale of military weaponry and technological assistance. In the interest of short-
term profit, Russia may in fact be undermining its own security by selling sensitive 
technologies to potentially dangerous customers. Three countries stand out in this respect: 
China, Iran, and Iraq, although Russian activities extend further afield. The Russian 
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Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) depends on the sales to these and other 
countries.106 
China has been an especially lucrative customer.107  Despite the potential threat to 
Russia that China presents, Russia has continued to sell sensitive technology to the 
Chinese, including guidance systems from the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs and three 
advanced upper-stage rocket engines in violation of the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR).108 An entire factory has been transferred to China that produces 
components for the SS-27 (TOPOL-M) ICBM.  Moreover, Russians are helping China 
build up to 50 new nuclear reactors. 109 
In the case of Iran, Russia has taken over the long delayed Bushehr project. While 
Bushehr has no capability to produce weapons grade fissile material, Minatom has 
offered the Iranians vast amounts of knowledge at bargain prices.110 Russian technology 
transfers to Iran have also included SS-4 missile technology. 111 Since 1996, Iranian 
graduate students have routinely studied under the direction of Russian nuclear scientists 
in Moscow. 112 Russian scientists have even traveled to Iran to give lectures in Tehran. 113 
In addition, Russia offered to build a gas centrifuge and a 40-megawatt heavy-water 
research reactor that would allow for the production of weapons grade fissile material.114 
This deal was well on its way to becoming a reality until Washington discovered the 
plans and began to publicly protest. 
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In the case of Iraq, a shipment of 800 guidance gyroscopes from dismantled SS-
18 missiles was diverted to that country. 115 These components came from a government-
operated missile dismantling facility operated partly through U.S.-provided Cooperative 
Threat Reduction (CTR) funds. The shipment was discovered and intercepted in Jordan 
before it reached its destination. It is unclear whether there was official involvement or 
sanctioning of the shipment, but at the very least, it offers an illustration of the lax export 
control and pervasive corruption found in Russia. 
 
D. RUSSIA’S NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AND ARMS CONTROL 
Russia’s policies regarding non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF) remain a major 
obstacle to the creation of further arms control regimes and continue to play a divisive 
role in the country’s relations with NATO.116  With an estimated stockpile of 10,000 to 
30,000 NSNF warheads, Russia’s NSNF arsenal greatly exceeds that of the United States 
in numerical terms.117 According to Russian political-military authorities, Russian NSNF 
compensate for Russia’s conventional military weakness in the face of NATO’s 
capabilities and perceived intentions, and these weapons have thus taken on increased 
importance in Russian military doctrine.118 Russian perceptions of the utility of NSNF 
serve as incentives to retain these weapons. Indeed, some prominent Russians are 
apparently willing to consider abandoning the 1991-2 commitments to limit NSNF. 
Russian policies and attitudes make reaching NSNF reductions and verification 
agreements all the more difficult.119 
This has created special concern within the Alliance. In a 1996 communiqué, the 
North Atlantic Council stated: 
At a time when NATO has vastly reduced its nuclear forces, Russia retains 
a large number of tactical nuclear weapons of all types. We call upon                                                  
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Russia to bring to completion the reductions in these forces announced in 
1991 and 1992, and to further review its tactical nuclear weapons stockpile 
with a view towards making additional significant reductions.120 
 
These concerns have been intensified by repeated Russian attempts to link NSNF 
reductions to the removal of U.S. nuclear forces from Europe. Such Russian proposals 
may be intended to play on European fears over the enormous quantity of Russian NSNF 
and thereby to drive a wedge between the United States and the European Allies over the 
issue of US nuclear forces in Europe.121 However, many European officials and experts 
support the retention of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe with a view to possible future 
negotiations with Moscow. The elimination of the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe would 
deprive NATO of any leverage in such negotiations. 
  
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Since 1991, several issues have complicated the pursuit of improved NATO-
Russia relations, even at times promoting mistrust and animosity between the two sides. 
In a situation in which Russia has been attempting to deal with its loss of power and 
prestige, Russians have often viewed NATO as exploiting Russia’s weakened condition 
for its own benefit. It is therefore hardly surprising that there have been serious 
challenges in the evolving NATO-Russia rela tionship. 
There have nonetheless been opportunities for more cooperative relations between 
Russia and the West. These opportunities have not been fully developed mainly due to 
the conflicting interests of the Russian elites. Powerful domestic political forces continue 
to play an important part in the formulation of Russian foreign policy. The Ministry of 
Defense, the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the foreign intelligence service, and the 
military-industrial complex have all found it in their interests to perpetuate an adversarial 
relationship with the West.122 
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The Minatom and Ministry of Defense policies of selling sensitive technologies to 
China and WMD proliferants are pursued because they bring much-needed capital to 
Russia’s cash-strapped agencies. Furthermore, the conflict in Chechnya has brought more 
power and political muscle to the military. Russia’s doctrinal commitment to nuclear 
weapons, including non-strategic nuclear forces, has caused some concern and 
consternation in the West; but it has made it clear that Russia’s military remains a force 
to be reckoned with, despite the deterioration of its conventional forces. In the Balkans, 
Russia’s foreign policy elite has tried to minimize foreign influence in a region that 
Russians have traditionally considered within their sphere. 
Much work must be done to overcome these obstacles. This effort cannot come 
only from the West. The Russian leadership must undertake the difficult and potentially 
dangerous task of reining in the Russians-notably the vendors of sensitive 
technologies-who have served their own interests at the expense of Russia’s interests. 
While it is not possible or reasonable to expect NATO-Russia cooperation and agreement 
on all issues (the Allies do not agree on every issue), a change in mentality and outlook 
must take place to address the many difficult challenges the Alliance and Russia will face 














Despite the various obstacles to improved NATO-Russia relations, including 
serious disagreements about some issues, there are some grounds for optimism. The 
shared interests in combating international terrorism have provided a means to move past 
some of these issues. In fact both sides have shown willingness to compromise on issues 
involving common strategic interests. These developments may bring Russia closer to the 
West in the global campaign against terrorism and allow the Russians the opportunity to 
benefit from a stronger relationship with the West.  
In the case of Chechnya, the West has found a new moderate position for the 
Russian point of view. Some Western leaders have softened their criticism of Russian 
human rights abuses. In an effort to garner Russian support in the war against terrorism, 
the West is now willing to revise its views on Russian operations in Chechnya. Lord 
Robertson, the NATO Secretary General, stated in a speech in Moscow on 22 November 
2001, “We will continue to have differences. But we must discuss them openly and try to 
understand each other…But we have certainly come to see the scourge of terrorism in 
Chechnya with different eyes.”123  
In the Balkans, where the main issue of contention has been Russia’s resistance to 
NATO’s influence, a NATO-Russia rapprochement over terrorism may lead to more 
cooperation in the future. Russian participation in SFOR and KFOR, regardless of 
Moscow’s motives in initiating the participation, has created a bridge for further 
understanding and cooperation, which has served to lessen bilateral misunderstandings. 
 Russia’s pledges to combat WMD and missile proliferation as part of the war on 
terrorism may help eliminate some of the problems over this issue.  At the very least 
Russia’s new approach may serve to open up more constructive dialogues on the issue. 
Furthermore, the results of the November 2001 and May 2002 Bush-Putin summit 
meetings are promising; they may lay the foundations for more comprehensive arms 
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control agreements and compromises on issues such as NSNF and missile defense in the 
future.   
Since 11 September 2001, President Putin has dramatically and boldly cast his 
future and Russia’s with the West. During this time, Putin’s popularity at home has 
grown, signaling support for his policies.124 This bodes well for the future of NATO-
Russian cooperation, because anti-Western elements in the military and the foreign 
intelligence service may be held in check by Putin’s strong and popular leadership. 
Cooperation also depends on continued reciprocal steps from the United States and other 
NATO Allies toward Russia. The Allies have agreed that Russia must be treated as an 
important and equal player in Euro-Atlantic security structures. 
The new “at 20” framework for NATO-Russia relations may hold the answers to 
this question. Going beyond Russia’s limited participation in PfP and the historical 
constraints of the PJC, the “at 20” framework may finally make Russia an essential 
partner in Euro-Atlantic security affairs, while preserving NATO’s institutional integrity. 
Once a cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia has been institutionalized, 
old animosities and distrust may be surmounted, laying the foundations for more 
cooperation and integration in the future. If successful, the “at 20” framework may 
provide the springboard to achieve this goal. 
There still remain reservations about the prospects for NATO-Russia dialogue and 
cooperation, both within Europe and Russia. Even in the United States, splits have 
reportedly arisen within the government over the role Russia should play in Europe, with 
the State Department considered firmly behind an “at 20” NATO-Russia arrangement 
and the Department of Defense portrayed as wavering on the issue.125 The recent trouble 
in the construction of an  “at 20” framework highlights the continuing opposition in some 
countries.126 Some influential people in NATO nations still see Russia as a potential 
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hindrance in Alliance decision making. Moreover, some Russians still see NATO as an 
institution that is inherently hostile to Russia and that seeks to deny Russia any 
meaningful participation in Euro-Atlantic security frameworks. Fears that Russian 
concerns and interests will not be taken into account in the building of a new NATO-
Russia framework persist. In March 2002 Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov  
expressed his displeasure at the manner in which the NATO-Russian talks to build an “at 
20” framework progressed, saying that the proposals have been “purely cosmetic.”127 
 These problems and concerns suggest that the old mindsets held by some people 
on both sides will be hard to overcome. However, distrust must be set aside to build a 
relationship that is more beneficial to both sides and that in the long run enhances the 
security of the Euro-Atlantic region. According to Secretary General Robertson, 
There is no issue more important to the security and stability of the Euro-
Atlantic area than the further development of a confident and cooperative 
relationship between us. We now have a unique opportunity to build a 
better, more stable future with full and wholehearted Russian 
participation. 128  
 
Can the new Russia-NATO partnership thrive as the memories of 11 September 
2001 begin to fade and the war on terrorism shifts from Afghanistan to other parts of the 
world? Some factors suggest that a long-term partnership can be sustained. Russia’s 
energy reserves will probably grow in importance to the West in the future, and the 
country’s geographic position will ensure its relevance to many international security 
questions.    
The United States should firmly support efforts to promote positive Russia-NATO 
interactions on an “at 20” basis. This framework may ensure continued constructive 
dialogue and cooperation in the campaign against the terrorist networks. The “at 20” 
framework may enable Russia to play an important role in the Euro-Atlantic security 
architecture with a meaningful contribution to the decision making process regarding 
certain issues. Russia would nonetheless not be able to interfere with the Alliance’s core 
collective defense mission. Closer cooperation with the West may also lessen the 
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influence of the anti-Western Russian elites and thereby help re-orient Russia’s 
sometimes adversarial foreign policy to one more amenable to close relations with 
Western nations.    
Regardless of the final institutional forms of the relationship, a stronger and more 
cooperative NATO-Russia relationship based on trust, mutual understanding, and shared 
Western values should be developed, with the terrible events of 11 September 2001 as a 
catalyst for change. Such a relationship could lead to a more peaceful, stable, and 
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